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A Consideration of the UK Government’s proposals for Business Improvement Districts in England: 




Purpose of this paper 
To provide a critical appraisal of the UK Government’s proposals for the introduction of Business 
Improvement Districts (BIDs) into England considering Statute and case law against the proposed 
regulations, whilst drawing upon the experience of BID models in North America. 
Design/methodology/approach 
The paper analyses the proposed regulations against the existing Statute and common law position in 
England.  
Findings 
The regulations will not levy all hereditaments as stated. The voting and taxation provisions are not defined 
and transparent in connection with those paying less than full rates. Implications of the House of Lords 
decision in Edison appear to have been overlooked in the drafting.  
Research limitations/Implications 
The paper is specific to the Draft Business Improvement Districts (England) Regulations 2004. The paper 
identifies key issues for those involved in the local economy and property management in England. It is 
relevant across jurisdictions to those considering proposals for the implementation of BID schemes.  
Practical Implications 
The paper is relevant to those occupiers and owners, and their advisors, who have an interest in property 
that is, or may be, included in a BID area.  
What is original/value of the paper 
The paper considers in an original manner the detailed proposals for the implementation of BIDs in 
England. It researches a number of areas of concern to those seeking to implement or pay a BID levy. It 
identifies a number of areas in which the regulations will not achieve the stated aims. Weaknesses in the 








Central Government has consulted on proposals for the implementation of Business Improvement Districts 
(BIDs) in England.  This paper provides a critical response to aspects of the proposed regulations of interest 
to those in the local economy.  In essence a BID, following the American model, may be seen as the most 
focused initiative yet to bringing a range of stated benefits, with consequential financial burdens, to a 
particular local economy. The origin and evolution of BIDs is discussed by Levy (2001).  
 
It is the apparent success of BIDs in the American context (Mitchell 2001) that has prompted their 
introduction to England. There are several fundamental differences between the operation of the two. In 
America, BIDs are a private sector led initiative often starting in a voluntary manner, the levy being 
charged on property owners and not property occupiers. The proposed regulations for England will impose 
a compulsory levy and a remedy for non-payment should a BID be voted in. The occupiers of property in 
England will be identified by reference to liability to non-domestic rating, the fundamental unit of which is 
the hereditament, that is the particular area of property upon which an occupier is taxed. The tax (rates and 
additional rate for the BID) is paid by the occupier, although if the property is vacant, (depending upon its 
type and the nature of the property) a proportion of the full tax may be paid by the owner. This paper does 
not consider in detail the various reliefs and exemptions that exist although, undoubtedly, their fairness may 
come to be considered if BID proposals develop. 
 
Fundamental to understanding the regulations and to appreciating their lack of transparency as they are 




Hereditament is defined in the draft Statutory Instrument as meaning: 
 
Anything which is or is treated as being a hereditament by virtue of the provisions of or any 
provisions made under section 64 of the 1988 Act1 including any hereditament to which regulation 
6 of the Non-Domestic Rating (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 19892 applies but otherwise 
excluding any hereditament to which regulations made under section 64(3)(b) of the 1988 Act 
apply. 
 
What is meant by a hereditament is of fundamental importance as it is the unit of property which is subject 
to non-domestic rating.3 
 
Section 64(1) of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 to which the draft Statutory Instrument refers 
states: 
 
A hereditament is anything which, by virtue of the definition of hereditament in section 115(1) of 
the [General Rate Act 1967], would have been a hereditament for the purposes of that Act had this 
Act not been passed. 
 
Following the evolution of hereditament back in time, as is required for comprehension by the draft 
Statutory Instrument, section 115(1) of the General Rate Act 1967 provided; 
 
Hereditament means property which is or may become liable to a rate, being a unit of such 
property which is, or would fall to be, shown as a separate item in the valuation list. 
 
                                                          
1
 Being a reference to the Local Government Finance Act 1988. 
2
 S.I. 1989/1060; as amended by S.I. 1993/616 
3
 As noted by Potter LJ at paragraph 14 Cinderella Rockerfellas Ltd v Rudd [2003] EWCA Civ 529 
There has been a substantial body of case law since the origin of rating in 16014 which supplements and 
provides detailed interpretation of existing legislation and developing alongside has been a range of 
Statutory provisions altering what and how something may be rated. A key example would be the rating of 
chattels. Originally they were rated, their rateability being abolished by the Poor Rate Exemption Act of 
1840. Since that date the liability of the occupier has been limited to when a chattel is used, enjoyed with, 
and enhances the value of the land5. Thus, chattels themselves are not ‘rateable’6. The interpretation of a 
hereditament within non-domestic rating is however very wide and can include public conveniences, 
advertising hoardings, mooring rights in addition to the more obvious shops, offices and industrial 
premises. 
 
The 1988 Act has substantially altered rating. Lord Hoffman has stated recently, the revolutionary change 
made by the 1988 Act was to convert non-domestic rates from a local tax into a central tax7. 
 
The extent of rating given the wide interpretation of what is a hereditament provides one fundamental 
criticism of the draft Statutory Instrument as drawn. The explanation lies in the fact that the introductory 
note to the proposed BIDs legislation suggests that the additional rate for the BID will be levied on all non-
domestic hereditaments, when this may not in fact be the case. It may be argued that this has the potential 
to bring about a result that is unreasonable or unfair8. 
 
All non-exempt, non-domestic hereditaments are rated, but under the 1988 Act they may appear on one of 
two rating lists. Sections 41 to 51 of the 1988 Act make provision for the local rating of non-domestic 
hereditaments i.e. those which are not included in a central list. Section 53 provides that the Secretary of 
                                                          
4
 Poor Relief Act 1601 
5
 Leading comment on the rateability of Chattels was provided by Lord Denning MR in Field Place 
Caravan Park Ltd v Harding (Valuation Officer) [1966] 3 All ER 247 at 250. 
6
 As noted by Potter LJ at paragraph 21 Cinderella Rockerfellas Ltd v Rudd [2003] EWCA Civ 529 
7
 Paragraph 43 R (on the application of Edison First Power Ltd) v Central Valuation Officer and another 
[2003] UKHL 20. 
8
 Following the broader interpretative assumption that Parliament should not bring about such legislation 
with this consequence, as reaffirmed by Lord Scott of Foscote at paragraph 139 in R (on the application of 
Edison First Power Ltd) v Central Valuation Officer and another [2003] UKHL 20. 
State may prescribe hereditaments that are to be centrally rated. The Central Rating Lists Regulations 19949 
contain the current designations which includes; for example PowerGen in respect of all its hereditaments 
‘wholly or mainly used for the purposes of the generation of electrical power’10; and British Telecom 
designated in respect of its ‘posts, wires, underground cables and ducts, telephone kiosks, towers, masts, 
switching equipment, or other equipment, or easements or wayleaves’11. A hereditament is therefore 
considered against the central list first and if it is not prescribed to a central list it will be considered against 
the local list. A British Telecom office building or retail unit does not fall within the central list designation 
and it will therefore appear on the local list. The central list was created in order that money would be paid 
centrally and redistributed to local authorities, the aim being to avoid disputes about the local authority area 
in which a hereditament, normally recognised as being occupied by what used to be called statutory 
undertakers, was situated when in fact it may be in many. Although it is possible for defined elements of a 
central list hereditament to be situated within one area, as would be the case for a power station, the 
situation regarding rail tracks and pipelines, for example, is more complex. 
 
The draft Statutory Instrument for BIDs specifically refers only to the local list and it does not include 
hereditaments on the central list explicitly. If only local list hereditaments are liable it cannot be the case 
that all hereditaments are subject to the levy. This is an omission that can be regarded as unreasonable for a 
number of reasons. The fundamental nature of the 1988 Act and what Parliament intended by its 
introduction is not reflected in the draft.  
 
The definition of what is a hereditament is the same for both lists: it is merely that specified hereditaments 
occupied by designated persons are to be centrally valued, listed and rated as one. These central list 
hereditaments do not have specific rateable values applied to individual hereditaments; all hereditaments 
occupied by designated persons are shown in the list as a whole and their taxable values either specified or 
                                                          
9
 Central Rating List Regulations 1994, SI 1994/3121 
10
 The Schedule to SI 1994/3121 Part 2 paragraph 1 
11
 By reference to Regulation 5 and Part 5, paragraph 2 to the Schedule to SI 1994/3121 and Regulation 
4(1) of the Non-Domestic Rating (Railways, Telecommunications and Canals) Regulations 1994, SI 
1994/3123. 
calculated according to a statutory formula. They are still hereditaments within the definition, and some 
will be located in areas covered by BIDs. 
 
The definition of hereditament for the purposes of the draft Statutory Instrument as noted above excludes 
any hereditament to which regulations made under section 64(3)(b) of the 1988 Act apply12. 
 
Section 64(3)(b) of the 1988 Act states that anything which would (apart from the regulations) be more 
than one hereditament shall be treated as one hereditament. If this is aimed at excluding central list 
hereditaments from the proposal it does not seem an open way of so doing. Neither would it remove the 
fact that such hereditaments are hereditaments within the terms of the definition used, nor that their 
occupiers would potentially gain benefit from being within a BID area, and should therefore contribute.  
 
The two lists are mutually exclusive - it is not possible for the same property to appear in both lists at the 
same time. Although it is possible for a hereditament to move from one list to another, this in itself has 
caused problems, as exemplified by the Edison case13 in the House of Lords. 
 
The Statutory Instrument proposes only to ballot and charge the occupiers of those hereditaments appearing 
on the local list. Those who have hereditaments, as defined under the definition being used within the 
Statutory Instrument, that appear on the central list, will neither be balloted nor charged. Not charging those 
designated occupiers within the central list when they have a qualifying hereditament as defined cannot be 
reasonable on those local list hereditaments that will be paying the totality of any supplement. The majority 
of designated central list occupiers are non public concerns and many compete in areas with those who are 
not designated on the central list. For example, the advertising on British Telecom telephone boxes for its 
directory enquiry service is effectively free, yet this service competes with others. 
 
                                                          
12
 Draft Regulations 1(2) commenting on the interpretation of hereditament. 
13
 R (on the application of Edison First Power Ltd) v Central Valuation Officer and another [2003] UKHL 
20 
It may also be considered unreasonable not to ballot central list occupiers when at some point they may 
have a hereditament (being exactly the same in nature) that moves from the central list to the local list, as 
was the case in Edison. 
 
Within the regulations, use is being made of a definition of ‘hereditament’ that is aimed at covering all 
rateable units. Yet percentage requirements for voting are only being drawn from the local list. Central list 
hereditaments are not individually described and their occupiers cannot vote. To vote in favour of a BID 
proposal it is proposed in the regulations that there needs to be both a majority of occupiers of rateable 
hereditaments by number and by 75% by rateable value. It does not seem reasonable to exclude central list 
ratepayers of their hereditaments from voting and from payment without expressly stating to others that this 
is happening. Although it does not seem reasonable to exclude them from the democratic process if they 
should pay, if they are not to pay, the proposals will not cover all hereditaments14 as is stated, and some 




The nature of occupation presents a further fundamental problem to the success of the proposals. 
 
Prior to 1966, only occupied property that was rated. Since that date, provisions have been made for certain 
unoccupied properties to be rated, with the rating liability placed upon the owner. It is one reason why keep 
trading clauses can appear in a lease to ensure that the tenants trade to the end of a lease, thereby giving the 
benefit of the initial concession relating to empty property rates to the landlords when the property reverts 
to them15. 
 
                                                          
14
 As in the Introduction provided by the Consultation Paper on the Draft Business Improvement Districts 
(England) Regulations 2004.  
15
 When a non-domestic property becomes empty it is generally the case that no rates are paid for the first 
three months, thereafter the rate is 50% of the occupied level. The benefit runs with the building and not the 
party charged. To complicate matters certain properties by use or designation (for example, industrial 
buildings, or Listed Buildings) are exempt from the payment of empty property rates. 
 
There will in general be a provision in any lease to ensure that the tenant pays all rates and taxes due. This 
only relates to the term of the tenancy, although it is also common to find a tenant to be obligated to 
minimize, or at least not to increase, the rates and taxes during the term of the tenancy. It is therefore 
questionable whether tenant occupiers would be able to vote in favour of any proposal to increase a tax that 
could at some future time be paid by their landlord without being in breach of covenant. Those drafting 
leases on behalf of landlords may need to expressly address the matter in future. 
 
It would be quite reasonable for a landlord to be hostile to certain BID proposals if the increase in the tax 
burden can be argued to reduce rents without bringing any value benefits. This argument would then be 
used against them when fixing a rent at rent review or in lease renewal negotiations. 
 
Whilst a landlord may have reasons not to support the BID proposal, the same could also be true for a 
tenant occupier. If the result of the BID is so very successful as to dramatically improve the area in 
question, this can be expected to enhance both property capital and rental values. The tenant will in effect 
be contributing to an increase in the level of rent and rateable value (and therefore rates) in the future. 
Symes and Steel (2003) comment on the paradox, ‘more customers mean property owners will charge 
higher rents and small businesses in particular can find themselves priced out of an area’. 
 
At present, there are no detailed provisions determined prior to any ballot to address clearly how occupied 
and unoccupied property is to be treated, in respect of both voting and payment. Given the complications 
and intricacies of Rating Law and the interrelationship with Landlord and Tenant Law, it may be that, if left 
to local BID bodies, some of them will devise proposals that may be subject to successful legal challenge. 
It may also be the case that they develop proposals that are counter productive for some of the reasons 
noted above. 
 
Poorly thought out procedures and administration have been identified as causing problems with a number 
of BIDs, for example the Madision Avenue and NOHO BIDs in New York. The problem with 
implementation in such circumstances is explored by Berman (1997). 
 Are all hereditaments included in the rating lists? 
 
At present, there is a duty on the valuation officer to maintain a correct local rating list16, but occupation 
and rate liability is calculated on a daily basis. Few people question whether the list is accurate in the sense 
that no one generally challenges omissions from it, save for the local authority that may make a proposal if 
on notification the Valuation Office Agency (VOA) does not do so.  
 
There are however a large number of structures and erections in many areas that probably ought to appear 
on the local rating list but do not. Many structures and erections tend to be placed by local authorities and 
include covered cycle parks and the like. These local authorities are also responsible for notifying the VOA 
of their presence. The absence of a relevant hereditament from the list may alter either an aspect of the 
voting mechanism as well as resulting in something that is unfairly exempt from both rates and the BID 
levy. 
 
New hereditaments are entered into the rating list following completion and there may be splits, mergers 
and deletions of existing hereditaments. Such changes to the list, which can occur some time after the 
change has actually been made, are back dated and back rates can be collected up to the effective date. Yet 
all these changes may occur to alter the position at the actual date of a BID ballot. The almost inherent 
inaccuracy of a rating list at a particular point in time, which is corrected later and back dated, cannot be 
foreseen specifically at the date of a particular ballot. There is the possibility that the ballot result would 




It will be found that in a range of BID areas local authorities occupy a significant number of hereditaments 
and control as landlord, a reasonable number by value. In addition to the local authority, major shopping 
                                                          
16
 This is expressly stated in the 1988 Act. 
centre owners can be expected to control a large proportion of hereditament value within a given BID area. 
There may be a concern as to the transparency of the democratic process on the part of smaller independent 
occupiers, especially if a voting turnout is low. These problems and concerns have been identified by 
Berman (1997) to be very real in the American experience. 
 
In addition there is the problem of voting rights given to owners of unoccupied or exempt property, to those 
ratepayers benefiting from a concession or subject to transitional relief. The regime of rating in England is 
far more complex than the base position in America, or Canada which saw the first BID. Lengthy 
adversarial lawsuits have occurred in America and are commented upon by Symes and Steel (2003) and 




The draft Statutory Instrument centres on the concept of the hereditament as a basis for a levy based on 
existing rating principles. The aim is to increase funding for a defined area for a defined purpose, or a range 
of purposes. At present not all occupiers bear an equal proportion of tax. Charities for example only pay a 
maximum of 20% of the occupied rates of others and may apply to the local authority for discretionary 
relief for the rest. The question is therefore raised in equity, is it fair that Charities should have the same 
voting rights as someone who will pay the full rate levy. Whilst if the levy is a percentage of rateable value 
rather than rates paid, Charities will see a greater increase in actual burden in percentage terms. 
 
It may also be reasonable to ask a further question namely, should a local authority with a BID area operate 
discretionary relief on the remaining 20% of rates for Charities within this area? If they receive the full 
discretionary relief, they will be benefiting entirely from the supplementary contributions of others. To be 
fair and transparent, when any bid vote is taking place, the position of these bodies should be clearly 
identified. 
 
To complete the consideration it would be appropriate to reflect adequately upon those buildings in a BID 
area that are exempt from rating altogether, and this would include derelict buildings and property used for 




It seems likely that certain central list hereditaments will fall wholly within a BID area and could be 
identified as such. Other central list items will cross a BID area boundary, for example, railway lines. This 
point will have considerable relevance if the definition of hereditament as appears to be the case, includes 
those items on the central list. To achieve its stated aim the BID area would need to be defined by specific 
reference to all rateable and non-rateable hereditaments irrespective of the list in which they may (or may 
not) appear. 
 
American BIDs have on occasions given residents a vote for a small contribution, often one dollar, leading 
to complaints from businesses about the residents’ voting strength. When residents have had no vote they 
have complained of ‘taxation without representation’. The proposals for England do not propose to levy an 
additional sum on residents17. The residents will also not have the right to vote although the money raised 
from a BID will be spent in the BID area and this may benefit residents living within the area. Already in 
the proposed BID pilots for England we have seen in their development manipulation of the BID areas to 
include commercial hereditaments to be levied, and to exclude residential areas, which will benefit but not 
be levied.  At least one Town Centre Manager drawing up the boundary for a BID pilot area has sought to 
include as many commercial hereditaments as possible; these will be levied if the BID is successful, thus 
raising more money. This is entirely reasonable from the Town Centre Manager’s perspective. Residential 
units will not be levied therefore incorporating them offers no advantage to the BID area. We may see BID 
areas being driven by tax base (use) rather than being created by reference to local history or need, the 
regulations certainly encourage this.  
                                                          
17
 The only residents that will be charged are those in live-work units in a BID area where that part of their 
accommodation that attracts the non-domestic rate will be levied. Thus, the Council Tax is unaffected by 
the additional levy. 
 In America it is recognised that the success of a BID area has led to pressure for the improvement of an 
adjacent area, often by the creation of a new BID, Mitchell (1999). This is part of the competitive pressure 
arising from small BID areas. The proposals for England have tended to be geographically large, often 
entire city centres or a substantial part thereof, for example Liverpool and Peterborough. The positive 
pressure through competition in BID area status in England may only be created in those central London 
BID areas that are geographically smaller. There may be a neglect and exclusion of those areas left outside 




The proposals envisage the BID pilots being developed with effect from 1 April 2005. This date is also the 
date of the implementation of the next rating revaluation. Many hereditaments will alter in rateable value 
between the date of the last revaluation, which took effect from April 2000 and this. Clarity would be 
required as to the rateable value to be used for any BID proposal. To use 2000 list rateable values will give 
rise to complaints of relative accuracy between hereditaments; those values are likely to have altered 
significantly over the five year period since the last revaluation (being the reason for the revaluation). To 
use the proposed values as at 1 April 2005, which have recently been notified, means that the 
implementation would also be based on rateable values many of which will be subject to appeal. There 
appears to be little research in any proposed BID area of the likely alteration in rateable values between the 
2000 and 2005 lists. Rateable values are not the same as rates paid but they provide the headline figure to 
which many occupiers relate. If they are to increase there may well be less of an appetite for voting in 
favour of proposals. If an increase in rateable values and rates paid occurs between the respective lists there 
will be greater pressure on an occupier wishing to minimise costs to vote against a supplementary increase. 
 
The purpose of BID proposals 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
This paper has focused on the proposals for BIDs in England. There has been little discussion of what they 
are designed to achieve. In America and Canada what a BID spends its money on is defined by the BID 
body. The most common areas of spending are security staff, street lighting, street cleaning and street 
furniture and decoration (Symes and Steel, 2003). An American BID may also be much more; the San 
Diego BID incorporates energy efficiency, whilst The Bryant Square BID in New York has taken over 
partial responsibility for the funding and management of the local park (Symes and Steel, 2003).  
 
The problems of Downtown North America in competing with out of town malls, the lack of parking, the 
aggressive begging and crime provided the spur for a voluntary initiative to compete (Symes and Steel, 
2003). The proposals for England vary within much tighter limits between the proposed BID areas. They 
again have a focus on security and cleanliness, although some like Bedford propose wardens to greet 
people and direct them to eateries. This function may result in sector bias and may serve to work better for 
visitors than locals. The BID proposals themselves may benefit certain occupiers over others although in 
general it would seem that retailers have the most to gain. BIDs are a ‘place marketing scheme’ and those 
benefiting from ‘place’ may benefit from a BID. Symes and Steel (2003) comment that; despite the high 
minded claims of many BID managers, BIDs are in essence simply localised attempts at ‘place marketing’. 
Those more neutral to place like office or industrial occupiers may not benefit and the proposals may be 
divisive amongst occupiers. In England there will be compulsion to pay the BID levy; however the origins 




The rating system in England is having grafted upon it an American BID model to which it is ill-suited. 
The American model is owner based whilst that proposed for England centres on occupiers. These 
occupiers may be voting for an area improvement that leads to an increase in the value of their 
hereditaments and therefore the rent that they may be required to pay. Would it not be better to levy the out 
of town occupiers and use the levy to strengthen town centres?  
 
The wording of the proposed regulations is inconsistent with the commitment to levy the increased tax on 
all non-domestic ratepayers. Those ratepayers appearing on the central list have been omitted from the 
voting process and the levy in a manner that is not transparent or justified. This may be seen as 
unreasonable by those others being asked to vote and pay the levy, whilst those on the central list that 
subsequently move to the local list may complain that they had no say in the matter. 
 
The voting and taxation provisions are not defined and transparent in connection with those paying less 
than full rates. The proposals do not adequately address those buildings currently exempt from rates in a 
BID area that will benefit from the proposals without being taxed at all. The proposals do not address an 
equitable treatment or transparency in voter knowledge of those benefiting from empty property relief, 
charitable status, discretionary relief, or transitional relief.  
 
The regulations do not appear to recognise the Landlord and Tenant relationship and how it may develop to 
influence the success of a BID scheme that centres on occupiers rather than owners. The fundamental 
change to rating brought about by the 1988 Act appears not to have been recognised. The proposals appear 
to regard rating still as a local tax.  The regulations do not adequately address the revolutionary change 
made by the 1988 Act [which] was to convert non-domestic rates from a local tax into a central tax, 
quoting Lord Hoffman in Edison18.  
 
The regulations lack clarity as to what rating list the figures are to be taken from given the proposed 
introduction of initial BIDs at the same time as a new rating list. The proposals also do not appear to 
recognise that the rating list is often subsequently altered or appealed and back dated to the relevant date. 
These subsequent changes may have affected the outcome of an earlier vote.  
 
The prescriptive nature of the regulations cannot be adapted to ‘microfit’ local conditions. Symes and Steel 
(2003) report the great strength of the BID system in America  being that local businesses can tax 
themselves a little or a lot, monthly or annually, under various plans, and spend money to their priorities. 
That great strength is not present in the proposals for England. What is present are a lot of areas that may 
give rise to successful legal challenge and claims of unfairness or lack of transparency.  
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 At paragraph 43 R (on the application of Edison First Power Ltd) v Central Valuation Officer and 
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